With only 45 jumps under their belt (18th on that canopy), this skydiver started their landing pattern too soon, which resulted in overshooting the landing area and slamming face-first into a tree. Damn you target fixation! This jumper said they focused on figuring out how to “land behind the trees or just in front of them," and although that didn't quite work out as planned, at least they picked out a Christmas tree.
This newer jumper didn't hesitate to admit they had target fixation. They saw something, they focused on that something and – lo and behold – they wound up slamming face-first into the aforementioned something.
This type of incident sometimes happens with new students because some instructors teach that you turn onto base at altitude X and then Y hundred feet later you turn onto final. This approach simplifies the pattern and makes it more digestible for new students but it doesn’t allow for flexibility and doesn’t prepare students to wing it (no pun intended) should something happen that makes them diverge from that plan.
This jumper noted that it was a no-wind day and, for newer jumpers, this can actually be the most difficult wind speed to negotiate when they’re still learning how to fly their canopies.
With target fixation, the most important factor is recognizing that the phenomenon exists. If you stare at the tree, you’re going to fly towards the tree, and you’re probably going to hit the tree! Once you know that this is what happens, you can make a conscious effort to not do it in the air.
The aforementioned strict approach, “Turn 90 degrees onto your base leg at this altitude. Fly for this long and then turn 90 degrees onto final,” is great for explaining the theory of a canopy pattern. However, as students start their progression, it’s important that they also learn that there can be flexibility in that pattern. You don’t need to – in fact, you probably shouldn’t – be doing a hard 90 degree turn at every corner in your pattern; rounding the corners a little is fine. Also, if you turn onto base a little early, that's okay too – as long as you pay attention to where everyone else in the air is – to take that leg a little longer and bleed off some altitude so that you’re not finding yourself on a taxiway or in a tree.
About 5 or 6 years ago, when I (the post author) had about the same jump numbers as this person, I was at the Ranch in Gardiner, New York. I saw someone turn towards me while I was still early in my pattern and – wanting to avoid the other jumper, and not thinking that I totally had room to keep flying his pattern – I turned onto base super early. Like the jumper in this video, I also turned onto final instead of taking my base longer. I wound up trying to thread the needle between a telephone pole and a shrub… with predictable results! My feet touched the ground just as my canopy hooked the corner of the pole. Notably, the guy who owns the shop was a good sport about the holes through the bottom and top skin of a cell on his rental!
This 4-way freefly jump could've ended badly as one of the jumpers got ejected from the skydive with a snappy premature opening. Yes, a loose BOC can lead to a premature opening. Surprise! Check. Your. Gear. People.
This premature opening happened because the pilot chute was not fully secured in the container’s BOC, and while it's hard to tell why it was loose, here are the possible culprits that caused this malfunction:
All three possible reasons for this loose pilot chute could have been prevented through very basic tasks. Each of these steps is something all jumpers -- regardless of skill level or jump numbers -- should keep in mind on every jump:
Examining the elasticity of a BOC to ensure it is still jumpable is a basic step in keeping gear in good working order.
If the jumper improperly stowed their pilot chute on the ground, a buddy check prior to boarding would have caught it. If it came loose in the plane, a handle check should have alerted this jumper of the possible danger.
Jumpers should take care to not scrape their containers – and especially their handles – against the aircraft both when boarding, getting to altitude and exiting. A key part is making sure to rotate your rig inwards towards the center of the door (and avoid the sides of the door) while climbing out.
There is a reason that some gear is called “freefly friendly” and some gear is not. When gear is not freefly-friendly it is typically because, if taken into orientations other than belly, it runs the risk of prematurely opening. Generally, a lot of student and rental rigs are not freefly-friendly and many dropzones have rules against students freeflying for this exact reason.
We cannot stress this enough: if your gear is not freefry-friendly, you shouldn’t be freeflying! We’re NOT being hyperbolic when we say that it can kill you. A neurosurgery PA we've discussed this with before noted that aortic dissections, traumatic brain injuries, and diffuse axonal injuries resulting in brain death are all possible when this type of incident happens. The body slows down as the canopy opens, but internal organs keep moving. Having them slam into the body at 180mph is a recipe for a bad day.
A 2-way "tracking" jump nearly ends in disaster when both jumpers lose sight of each other and fly through each other's airspace on opening. The trailing skydiver narrowly misses the leader as he deploys, skimming the parachute by (what appears to be) inches. This is how accidents/fatalities happen!
This seemingly smooth AFF jump escalated quickly once the student lost stability, with the main-side instructor chasing the student into the basement and deploying their main canopy with a ripcord. The instructor ends up with an AAD fire, a two-out that started to down-plane, and an off-DZ landing with a very rad PLF (catch that at the 2:37 mark at the end of the video).
Instructors care about students. It’s in their nature to do everything they can to make sure jumpers under their care have a canopy over their heads at the end of a jump. However, as noted in the USPA IRM, “Under no circumstances should an instructor attempt to catch a student or remain with a student below the instructor’s minimum deployment (2,500 feet).” This instructor was fixated on getting his student’s main canopy deployed and, consequently, he was about 1,000 feet below his hard deck when he pitched.
As a result of the target fixation on the student, the instructor was very low when he deployed his main. The sniveling main did not decelerate him below his AAD’s settings and the cutter activated, deploying his reserve. Fortunately, it was a clean deployment and the canopies did not entangle so, when they down-planed, he was able to cutaway.
Instructors have many concerns during a jump and it may be difficult to check a wrist-mounted altimeter while attempting to control a student. That is why USPA states "audible altimeters are strongly recommended for USPA instructional rating holders when making training jumps with students." This instructor did have an audible and still got fixated on their student. This reality says a lot about how hard it can be to maintain altitude awareness while chasing a student into the basement… but it’s a critical and fundamental item for an AFF-I.
This instructor stated that he deployed his main at approximately 1,500ft. Some instructors and examiners who viewed this video stated that, at that altitude, it may have been more prudent for him to have gone straight to his reserve. This argument was presented because, if he had a high-speed malfunction, he may have not had time to deploy his reserve.
As this skydiver was tracking away at break-off, they noticed an open canopy below them at the last second just as they were about to deploy, so they kept tracking to get clean airspace and avoid a mid-air collision. Not cool.
One of these two groups may have slid into the other’s airspace. Either the first/lower group accidentally moved up jump run or the second/higher group moved down jump run.
Another potential cause for this incident was a lack of separation. If the second group rushed their count or wasn’t aware of ground speed, it’s very possible that they got out too quickly and were in freefall almost directly over the group which exited before them.
While on the ground, jumpers should check what direction the aircraft will be traveling for jump run. Then, after exiting the plane, they should ensure that their movements are perpendicular to that direction. Notably, this is particularly challenging while doing a solo jump because it is difficult to know whether you’re sliding around. (That’s why more experienced jumpers cringe when they hear the words “solo freefly” while in the loading area.)
Many planes have those handy-dandy signs that tell you “If ground speed is X, allow for Y seconds of separation.” If you ignore them and get out on top of the group before you, this is what can happen. Further, many newer jumpers get excited about getting out the door and count a very quick “ONE-TWO-THREE-FOUR-FIVE-EXIT!!!” instead of a calm and accurate “One Thousand… Two Thousand… Three Thousand… Four Thousand… Five Thousand… Exit.” An experienced jumper who viewed this video said that one way for younger jumpers to avoid this issue is by counting out loud; it’s harder to rush the count if you’re vocalizing it.
This jumper – who did one hell of a job noticing that canopy deploying under them – made a very quick decision to track further and tried to get past the other jumper. Some people may say the correct decision would have been to immediately deploy. Both arguments have some validity but by tracking further this jumper avoided the possibility of a slow deployment, snivel, or high-speed malfunction that might have caused a collision with the lower jumper. Personally, given that he still had altitude, I think this was probably the better choice.
At around 200 jumps, this jumper started learning to freefly. The jumper filming video had done a few three-ways with the “student” and realized he was corking a lot, so he invited him on some two-ways instead (good call!). The newer jumper was having a lot of problems staying on level and their friend was having a hard time getting up to him. When the newer jumper lost sight on their buddy, they thought they were super high and decided to go into a stand… and went straight down into their friend, impacting their thigh for some full-contact skydiving.
The newer jumper was still learning but the more experienced jumper, who knew going into the jump that their friend corked a lot, wasn’t able to get up to the other jumper on stay on level with them.
The newer jumper didn’t know where the other jumper was, so he just decided to turn himself into a meat missile to get lower.
As previously noted, the newer jumper’s issues with corking were already known. The more experienced jumper should have talked him through what to do if he went high and lost sight of his buddy. That conversation should have included something along the lines of, “Don’t go into a stand if you don’t know where I am.”
As previously noted, the more experienced jumper did the right thing pulling this person aside from larger groups and wanting him to fly one-on-one. However, it appears that he didn’t have the range to be able to stay with the “student” when he went high. If you know that you can’t get floaty enough to stay with someone that needs some help, then you should probably refer them to someone who can.
One final note that was included in this video submission was that, after viewing this video, the newer jumper hired some freefly coaches for some one-on-one time. That’s a mature and humble move and we absolutely loved reading that this jumper made that call.
On a shallow beginner angle jump with 5 jumpers, one of the skydivers turns into a meat missile and causes a high speed collision with another jumper (the leader).
(This video was submitted without any details… so we’re making some educated guesses.)
It doesn’t matter if you’re on a belly, freefly, tracking or angle jump; some variation of “Level. Slot. Dock” always applies. On an angle jump, you should typically get level on the outside and then slide over into your slot. This individual – who was probably getting last out on what doesn’t look like a tight exit – likely saw the group underneath him, tried to dive into his slot, and then flared out too late.
Only three out of five jumpers were able to stay relatively tight with one another so this group may have had too many people in it and/or the skill levels may have been too low for this level of a jump.
Sometimes people get into the mentality that briefings (and even mockups) are only for bigways and formally organized jumps. However, almost every jump can be made safer by taking a few minutes on the ground to go over basic safety concerns.
Boogie jumpers are used to having organizers and it’s something that can – and should – happen on the average weekend of jumping. Having a single person lead the jump can ensure that everyone on a jump is prepared for what’s about to go down. It also gives the group a single person who can control the jump and make sure that the jump is flying to the level of the weakest flyer and not leaving them off in the distance in a situation that could turn dangerous.
This jumper could have easily been knocked unconscious or suffered a traumatic brain injury. If anyone has a friend who thinks AAD’s are dumb or that impact rated helmets are just a cash grab by companies who want to sell a more expensive product… show them this video.
This skydiver deployed their main and opened into line twists, but couldn't spin out of the line twists and decided to cutaway -- but as they were chopping, the reserve also began to deploy! This jumper had 135 jumps at the time and it appears this might have been due to out-of-sequence emergency procedures. Fortunately, the reserve didn't entangle with the main and they landed safely on reserve.
Several individuals who viewed this video, before knowing the exact jump numbers (135 jumps), noted that this jumper was likely on too aggressive a canopy for their skill level and probably shouldn’t have been on what appears to have been a five-way freefly jump.
It’s difficult to see what this jumper’s hands were doing once he decided to cutaway, but based on the fact that we see their reserve fire before they’ve cutaway, it’s possible that they performed their emergency procedures (EPs) out-of-sequence.
Several instructors who viewed this video had the same reaction: This jumper shouldn’t have been on this jump or that canopy. They were unable to join their group, never checked their altimeter, the line twists were controllable at first but they let them get worse, and they did not seem to know how to undo the twists once they happened.
It seems likely that, in a rush to perform their EP’s, this jumper may have deployed their reserve a moment before they cutaway. As one master rigger noted, a jumper only needs to “dislodge the reserve handle 1.75 inches to pull the pin,” so it’s very easy for a jumper who attempts to pull both at the same time to inadvertently fire off their reserve before they’ve finished chopping.
In this video, we noticed another jumper was also unable to get to the group and that the group punched through blatantly obvious clouds. Both facts suggest that the jumpers involved may have not had the experience to be flying together. Unfortunately, it is common for newer jumpers to get together and not realize that what they’re doing is too advanced for them. A good practice is to seek out a more experienced jumper to review your dive plan and make sure you’re staying safe.
During an AFF jump, both instructors lose their student shortly after exit and they had a difficult time getting back to the unstable student. One of the instructors reaches the student but was unable to regain control of the student's body. At that point, the student thought he had lost both instructors so he followed his training and attempted to deploy his main canopy... but the bridle wrapped around his neck! Luckily the instructor was still holding on to the student and helped clear the bridle for the main canopy to open.
An experienced AFF-I and AFF-I Examiner both viewed this video and pointed out that the issues began with a poor exit. The set up in the door leaves the main-side instructor in a poor situation and initiates the chain of events. The issues are magnified when both instructors let go of the student. The main-side instructor then finds themselves unable to get down to the student while the reserve-side instructor is unable to stabilize him.
The individuals who consulted on this video analysis believe these instructors made many fundamental errors. The exit was messy with far too much room between the main-side instructor and the student, the main-side instructor appears to have not been holding onto the student’s grippers before then being unable to get down to the student, and the reserve-side instructor could not stabilize him. These are all basic skills which an AFF-I should be capable of. Further, the release of the student by both instructors is a major error which should have not been allowed to occur.
The student, while admittedly unstable, did an admirable job following his training and – upon finding himself without his instructors – began attempting to stabilize and deploy his main. Notably, at the time of his deployment he did not realize an instructor had caught back up to him and was attempting to flip him.
